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1. Introduction
The development of the European Union caused the displacement of arenas of policy­
making and the increase in the number of relevant decision-makers, especially from 
outside the nation-state, making policy outcomes more unpredictable. Wright (1998: 44) 
argues that the EU membership ‘has become a rallying political slogan for some 
localities’ provoking institutional reforms, especially at regional level, and hampering 
traditional state regional policies by creating new networks and new tasks on regions. 
Hence, regions have been strengthening their existence at the European level and have 
been emerging as actors leading to regionalism movements. These developments are 
connected to the mobilization activities of subnational actors and their active 
participation within the framework of Multi-level Governance within the EU. This 
framework has moved beyond the conceptual approach to the understanding of how the 
EU works and has been put into practice by European institutions, such as the 
European Commission, the European Parliament or the Committee of the Regions, 
through the presence of the MLG framework in their position papers.
According to Benz (1998: 128), a region is to be understood as an intermediary 
structure incorporating activities which connect to the local specifics and that require 
coordination because of the existing interdependencies. This structure is also to be 
conceptualized as embedded in and constitutive part of a certain economic, political and 
cultural context. Hence, the EU provides the multi-level structure in which regions 
perform their activities.
Benz and Eberlein (1999: 331) argue that the process of European integration is 
challenging firstly due to its market competition specificities which seem to be more 
difficult at the regional level and, secondly, due to its demands of political representation 
and coordination which creates at the regional level, a two-fold need of adjustment. 
Hence, interest conflicts between public and private actors need to be tackled in order to 
facilitate the mobilization of regional resources and to improve their activities, their so 
called Europe-capability or ‘Europafähigkeif.
From this perspective, the focus of this paper is on the contribution of Saxony-Anhalt as 
part of the regional, or subnational as it can also be expressed, level within the multi­
level governance framework of the EU. Saxony-Anhalt was chosen as the case study 
because it offers a model of regional participation within the multi-level governance of 
the EU. Its participation encompasses both types of multi-level governance, as 
developed by Hooghe and Marks (2001). This paper deals with the first type of multi­
level governance and how Saxony-Anhalt has contributed to the European Cohesion 
Policy from this perspective. The findings of the analysis emphasize the complexity of 
the EU functioning system and highlight, how a region can establish itself as stake­
holder within this system.
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2. The two types of Multi-level Governance
The concept of ‘Multi-level governance’ was elaborated and developed by Gary Marks 
(1993, 2001) and later developed by him together with Liesbet Hooghe (2001, 2003, 
2009, 2010). This concept seeks to explain how the authority of central governments is 
dispersed vertically to actors active at other levels, such as the European supranational 
one, and horizontally to non-state actors (Gamble, 2004: v). This dispersion of authority 
has fostered the development of the subnational level, especially in countries with ‘little 
tradition of regional government’ (Gamble, 2004: vi). Marks (1993: 392) defines the 
concept of multilevel governance:
(...) we are seeing the emergence of multilevel governance, a system of continuous 
negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers -  supranational, 
national, regional, and local -  as the result of a broad process of institutional creation 
and decision reallocation that has pulled some previously centralized functions of the 
state up to the supranational level and some down to the local/regional level. ’
Tömmel and Verdun (2009: 1-2) define ‘Governance’ as the meta-concept describing 
the way the European Union functions. Accordingly, this concept comprises following 
elements:
• European policy-making processes, which encompass diversified procedures 
and practices, and combine formalized modes of rule setting with the informal 
practices of negotiation, cooperation and consensus building;
• A multilevel and multi-actor structure, which puts the European policy-making 
processes into practice;
• Diverging patterns of implementation;
• The umbrella under which all the above occur.
Therefore, the main argument is that through the supranational institutionalization the 
decision-making authority is no longer monopolized by the governments of member 
states (MS) but it is diffused to different levels of decision-making, namely subnational, 
national and supranational. As a result, the decisions are prepared by negotiations, 
which occur among the different territorial levels of governments. Looking at the 
developments within the EU, the concept evolved from nested to interconnected 
governance (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2009: 8). Thus, the actors and their activities 
are as well interconnected. The proceedings from one level can influence the 
functioning of the others. Hence, the permanent communication among the different 
governance levels is a vital element for regions.
A further perspective on the characteristic of MLG is that it provides a ‘sense of politics 
escaping from the control of nation states and becoming located in other agencies and 
institutions’ (Gamble, 2004: vi). Nevertheless, the national governments still need to 
communicate with the European and the regional level, in order to coordinate, contribute 
to policy-making and make use of their decision-making authority.
Benz and Zimmer (2010: 18) argue that research results on the vertical allocation of 
competences within the EU propose to regard the EU and its member states as the 
same jurisdiction. The acclaimed drift of sovereignty towards the European level is 
merely a ‘political process of dividing and sharing of competences’, empowering the fact 
that patterns of multi-level governance apply for most European, national and 
subnational powers within the EU. These developments have also contributed to the 
theoretical development of the multi-level governance approach. Following this line of 
argument, Benz and Zimmer (2010: 19) argue that the power transfer towards the EU 
should no longer be considered as a zero-sum game, but it should be understood as a
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search of solutions for interdependent tasks which reach beyond the national 
governments. Hence, analysis goes beyond the interplay between different levels and 
encompasses multiple actors with different backgrounds that fit into specific patterns of 
interaction that are characterized by their dynamics and flexibility and which the 
literature often describes as networks.
The MLG patterns within the EU depend on the content of the policies and on the 
competences the different levels have. Hooghe and Marks (2010: 18-20) differentiate 
between two types of multi-level governance. Type one is described as the one built 
upon the intellectual foundation of federalism. Its characteristics are: power sharing 
among several general purpose governments operating at different levels, bundled 
functions, non-intersecting membership and system-wide framework. Within this type, 
change normally means reallocating policy functions across existing levels of 
governance. The second type is based on task-specific jurisdictions, intersecting 
membership, many jurisdictional levels and flexible design. In Europe the first type of 
multi-level governance has been pushed forward by the simultaneous empowerment of 
supranational and subnational institutions. The EU bundles policy competencies that in 
other parts of the world are handled by numerous, overlapping and functionally specific 
jurisdictions. Most EU policies have a single unified jurisdiction. On the other hand, 
some salient features of the EU architecture are consistent with the second type, such 
as variable territorial jurisdictions, as a result of treaty derogations or distinct 
governance systems.
Multi-level governance embodies the contrasting visions of the collective European 
decision-making. Type I is at the heart of democratic elections, party systems and 
sustains a class of politicians who mediate the preferences of citizens into law. It is best 
suited to political deliberation on basic value choices in a society: who gets what, when 
and how, such as the distribution of European funds. Type II is oriented towards problem 
solving and efficiency. Either way, European governance has the recognition of its 
binding decision-making. The enforcement of these binding legislative acts of the EU is 
mostly being accomplished by the subnational authorities. But in some cases, these 
subnational actors manage to be part of the decision-making process, which they will 
later implement. This participation is based on prepared and established interests of the 
actors involved. (Hooghe and Marks, 2010)
The European multilevel governance has not emerged as a wish to federalize the 
European Union. The involvement of regional actors was intended as an instrument for 
improving the implementation of European Regional policy. The increased potential of 
regional actors to influence the European policies developed in time. But this should not 
be seen as a negative occurrence. (Conzelmann, 2008: 15) Another important aspect is 
the difference between the action scope and perspective of institutions and actors. 
Marks, Hooghe and Blank (1996: 348) differentiate between institutions and actors, as 
they understand institutions -  of the state or of the EU -  as ‘sets of rules’ and actors as 
‘the particular individuals, groups, and organizations which act within those institutions.’ 
Hence, the concept of actor used in this work regards the institutional framework of 
action as well.
If Benz and Zimmer (2010) consider that the EU and MS are part of the same 
jurisdiction, the way territorial levels interpret governance may be different. This 
particular interpretation of governance is then reflected in the way institutions strategize 
their involvement in MLG.
The role of regional actors as active participants in European governance is increasing. 
This development is related to the incentives from the European Commission and its 
openness for the input of these actors, and to the actual input and participation of
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subnational actors. In this regard, regionalization has been one process triggered by the 
European integration, followed by the actual mobilization of regional actors and their 
activity at European level and with European actors and institutions.
The base for the emergence of a regional component within European politics is the 
acknowledgement of regions as actors at the European level. This acknowledgement 
provides the opportunity for interaction between regional actors and the actors active 
and present at the European level. From this perspective, the research agenda also 
needs to examine regions as elements of the broader processes of politics. In this 
regard, Keating (1998: 78) acknowledges the emergence of regions as political arenas 
and actors which are part of the new system of decision making.
Keating (1998: 164) points out the dynamic interplay of interests that has emerged with 
the increased activity of regional actors who pursue regional interests. This takes place 
among the regions, the member states and the EU. The regions are not the solely actors 
striving to achieve something, but they become actors taken into consideration by 
European actors in pursue of their own policies. Carter and Paqueir (2010: 296) also 
envisage regions as spaces for politics in the context of regions being considered no 
longer objects but subjects of the European politics processes. Within this context, the 
activity of regions within the MLG framework of the e U relies on their mobilization.
Jeffery (2000: 1-2) uses the term of subnational mobilization in order to describe the 
activity of regions within the EU. Jeffery defines mobilization as the ‘growing 
engagement of sub-national governmental actors with the institutions and processes of 
EU policy-making.’ He enumerates the developments within the European Union which 
indicate mobilization: established formal involvement mechanisms for subnational actors 
within their state, mushrooming of regional information and liaison offices in Brussels, 
interregional cooperation especially due to EU programmes, treaty changes which 
introduced the possibility of subnational input into the Council of the EU, the creation of 
the Committee of the Regions and the establishment of the principle of subsidiary. 
(Jeffery, 2000: 2) On the other hand, Hooghe (1995: 177) notes that subnational 
mobilization can be used as an instrument to challenge state power and to support 
supranational authority, especially over territorial interest and a contested hierarchy 
problem.
Jeffery (2000: 3) draws the attention upon the variety of the subnational authorities and 
their ability to influence through their mobilization. He mainly argues that the influence- 
creating channels of access to EU policy-making for subnational actors are to be found 
within the Member State. Hence, Jeffery pleads that the concept of multi-level 
governance needs to be complemented with intra-state factors. Based on the 
proposition that ‘SNAs mobilize in order to gain access and to exert influence on EU 
policy-making’, Jeffery argues that the influence outcome on policy of subnational 
mobilization occurs under certain conditions. As he emphasizes that mobilization is not 
synonymous to influence, Jeffery connects the variation among subnational authorities 
according to their capacity and commitment to mobilize and their ability to transform 
mobilization into influence. According to Jeffery (2000), the extent of subnational 
mobilization is determined by the ability of actors to adapt to change and to transform 
the mobilization into influence.
MLG has been gaining importance, especially in the practice of European policies. The 
EU institutions identify the high degree of determination of the subnational mobilization 
and regional participation that the member states and their particular institutional and 
political setting have. Nevertheless, the EU and its multi-level governance system 
provide incentives for change. As Hooghe and Marks (2009: 19-21) argue, there are 
fundamental reasons for MLG. Firstly, there is the efficiency. According to economic
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principles of public goods, the goods should be provided at the closest level to the 
beneficiaries. Secondly, MLG results and contributes to the development of democracy, 
especially in the case of the member states that joined the EU after 1980. The last 
reason in favor of MLG is that through European integration decentralization has been 
increased providing economic cooperation and competition among regions.
The next section shortly presents the way Saxony-Anhalt has made use of the MLG 
structure of the EU and has mobilized in order to contribute to the shaping of the 
European Cohesion Policy, sticking to a specific interest, namely that of developing 
rules for a category of transition regions as an funding eligibility category.
3. Regional participation of Saxony-Anhalt within MLG Type I -  European 
Cohesion policy
European integration has offered great incentives for the German Länder created in 
1990. Becoming members of the European Union meant not only attracting European 
funds but also implementing the European legislation. The adjustment and return to the 
federalism was a major challenge for the new Länder. Hence, active participation of the 
Länder in European policy-making processes was an instrument for improving their 
development within the European Union. This active participation has been implemented 
by Saxony-Anhalt with regard to the shaping of the regulations for the use of the 
European funds.
Hooghe (1996: 121-2) argues that the multi-level polity of European Cohesion Policy is 
made of ‘a mixture of uneven, unequal unstable relationships and a compound of co­
operative and unilateral strategies.’ Then, how MLG indeed works depends on the 
governance and government culture of each of the institutions, their actors and the 
whole political constellation involved. If the goodness of fit between MLG and domestic 
institutions and their preferences gave a push to MLG implementation and the misfit 
between them had little impact, then the partnership principle had little impact on the 
territorial relations. As Bache (2004) points out, policy processes may involve multi-level 
participation, but this does not necessary means it will turn into multi-level governance. 
Nevertheless, actors from the local and regional level have the Committee of the 
Regions as a partner in Brussels, next to the Commission.
This section focuses on how the incentives of European funds trigger subnational 
mobilization for participation within the policy-making process of the European cohesion 
policy. The implementation and the use of these funds are managed within the member 
states, but the main regulations are decided at the European level.
The implementation of the European Cohesion policy depends on many European 
regulations. Among these, the defining ones are the regulation for the multi-annual 
financial framework (MFF), namely the EU budget for the seven years established 
periods, as in the case for 2007-2013 and 2014-2020, and the cohesion policy 
regulations. This policy is in a ‘symbiotic relation’ with other European policies such as 
state aid regulation or public procurement that are policies of the European internal 
market. (Bovis, 2011: 107)
The MFF regulation sets the financial amount for the policies for period of seven years. 
This amount is particularly important for the programming of the cohesion policy. The 
cohesion policy regulations contain the main rules and priorities for the use of the funds 
and provide the framework for the programming activities within the MS. Bovis (2011: 
86) defines the process of programming, as ‘a partnership-based decision-making
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process, in several stages, until the measures are taken over by the public or private 
bodies entrusted with carrying them out.’ The same principles, especially of partnership 
and MLG are the base of the common provisions for the use of the European funds for 
2014-2020, as stated in Art. 5 of the Common Provisions Regulation (Official Journal of 
the EU, 2013: L347/341).
Partnership has been considered an important element of the implementation of the 
European Cohesion Policy. Officially, the partnership principle ‘aimed to maximize the 
effectiveness of EC regional policy interventions by giving subnational actors a formal 
role in the implementation process for the first time’ (Bache, 2004: 166). From a bottom- 
up perspective of MLG, partnership requires the participation of subnational 
governmental representatives together with the national and European authorities in all 
the processes of cohesion policy, namely the programming, the implementation and the 
monitoring of development programs (Marks, 1993: 396).
Ahner (2012) makes reference to the partnership principle enshrined in the regulations 
for cohesion policy. For this purpose, the functions of information and experience 
exchange are best implemented through the presence of regions in Brussels, mostly 
through their representations. Regional actors in Brussels organize discussions at which 
officials of the European Commission participate and at which they present the ongoing 
process of policy-making. This way, they gather as well information on the problems and 
challenges that actors from the territory are faced with. Such a challenge has been the 
statistical effect caused by the EU enlargement in 2004 that affected the eligibility of 
regions for the European Cohesion Policy.
For the 2007-2013 funding period, the regulation for the Cohesion Policy defined three 
categories of regions according to the objectives: the Convergence Objective, the 
Regional Competitiveness Objective and the European Territorial Objective. The 
Convergence Objective aimed to provide financial support for the regions whose GDP 
was less than 75% of the EU average. The shift occurred when the EU average GDP 
was calculated as EU-25 instead of EU-15. Then, the regions that had a GDP less than 
75% of the EU-15 GDP average shifted above the 75% of the EU-25 GDP average. 
Hence, the regulation took into consideration this shift, adding the provision of transition 
financial support for the regions affected by the statistical shift. The goal for this 
transition aid was for those regions ‘to complete their convergence process.’(Official 
Journal of the EU, 2006: L201/26). Moreover, such transition aid was allocated for the 
eastern Länder of Germany that were eligible for the transitional support. (Official 
Journal of the EU, 2006: L201/74) The precise amounts and percentages of funds 
allocated to the regions were based on the affiliation of the regions to the three 
categories, the Convergence Objective providing the highest support for the regions that 
were lagging behind economically.
The combination of the financial crisis and the reduced allocations of European funds 
provided for a strong incentive for subnational mobilization in the regions affected by 
such a shift, among which Saxony-Anhalt has been active before the 2004 enlargement. 
Its mobilization pursued to provide the European Commission with the information 
related to such changes within the regions. The Commission addressed this concern of 
the region. The statistical effect has been regarded in the Cohesion regulations for 
2007-2013 but the regulation stipulated that it should end in 2013.
The European funds contributed to the modernization of Saxony-Anhalt. (Rannenberg 
and Wolf, 2002: 145-6) The statistical shift was mainly connected to an upgrade for 
Saxony-Anhalt that meant a decrease in the funds allocation. Saxony-Anhalt had the 
interest to continue receiving the highest amounts of EU funds in order to continue its 
development and deal with its economic situation after 1989, which meant among other
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struggling to create jobs in order to reduce the unemployment and the debt. Thus, 
Saxony-Anhalt continued to gather support from other regions and to promote this 
interest at the European level. From this perspective, Saxony-Anhalt continued its 
mobilization for the support of an individual category of transition regions so that the EU 
would continue the financial support for the regions that managed to develop beyond the 
threshold of 75% of the EU average. These transition regions did not manage to 
develop so far that they exceeded the >= 90% of the EU average, hence requiring 
further support.
The European Commission recognized the importance of the gradual development and 
the current regulations for the 2014-2020 funding period are based on the categories: 
less developed regions (GDP per capita less between 75% and 90% of the average 
GDP of the EU-27); transition regions (GDP per capita less than 75% of the average 
GDP of the EU-27) and more developed regions (GDP per capita less above 90% of the 
average GDP of the EU-27). (Official Journal of the EU, 2013: L347/382) An example for 
the way the transition rules work is:
’77. (...) In order to ensure the long-term sustainability of investment from the Structural 
Funds, to consolidate the development achieved and to encourage the economic growth 
and social cohesion of the Union’s regions, regions whose GDP per capita for the 2007­
2013 programming period was less than 75% of the average of the EU-25 for the 
reference period but whose GDP per capita has grown to more than 75% of the EU-27 
average should receive at least 60% of their indicative average annual 2007-2013 
allocation. (...)’ (Official Journal of the EU, 2013: L347/330)
Even though the negotiations of the MFF and the allocation of European funds takes 
places among the MS within the Council and the EP, as co-legislator, regions have the 
opportunity to get involved in the early stages of the preparation of the regulations. Such 
an early involvement has been pursued by Saxony-Anhalt due to the acknowledged 
statistical effect on the funds allocation that the 2004-EU enlargement triggered.
The question of funds allocation is a complex one, in which both regions and member 
states play crucial roles. Dunford and Perrons (2012: 2-3) argue that the end result of 
the allocation process is that the formula-driven allocation mechanisms are overridden 
by politico-economic considerations during final allocations negotiations. The process of 
establishing the budget of the European Union involves the proposal of the Commission 
and the negotiations in the two decision-making bodies, the Council and the Parliament. 
The ‘driving force in deciding the resources available for Europe-wide policies is the 
Member-States’, especially deciding first on the expenditure ceiling. Hence, regions can 
contribute and present their interests especially during the drafting period of the 
regulations.
The government of Saxony-Anhalt pursued the development at the European level of 
the cohesion policy-making process and its progress. For this purpose, resources have 
been mobilized and they performed specific functions, such as obtaining information 
from actors at the European level but also providing the European institutions with 
information from the region required for the preparation of European policies. A further 
activity of Saxony-Anhalt was to cooperate with other European regions that were 
confronted with the same challenge of reduced allocation of European funds due to the 
EU enlargements. (Sălăgeanu, 2014)
The mobilization of Saxony-Anhalt took place through cooperation and information 
sharing on the one hand and through the use of their actors within European structures 
on the other hand. In the case of the latter practice, the Committee of the Regions’ 
member from Saxony-Anhalt mobilized in the discussions around the Cohesion Policy. 
He was active as rapporteur in the case of regulation proposals or cohesion reports in
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several cases. This activity gave him the opportunity to engage in discussions with 
officials from the European Commission and the European Parliament, to find 
representatives of other regions who shared the interests of Saxony-Anhalt and to 
contribute to the enlargement of the cooperation of actors with similar interests. 
(Sălăgeanu, 2014) These activities fit MLG Type I since they are contributing to policy­
making processes and broadening consultations.
Since the existence of the Committee of the Regions, Saxony-Anhalt has not had many 
different members. Its members have been very engaged in the work of the CoR. Even 
though the CoR has no legal decision-making power, the inter-institutional cooperation 
has increased in the last years and through the ongoing exchange with the Commission, 
the European Parliament and lately with the European Council, the CoR has provided 
for another active channel for participation within MLG. The openness to the subnational 
participation has also been an element of the MLG understanding of the CoR. Moreover, 
the positions of the CoR need to speak for the all its members, not only for Saxony- 
Anhalt. Therefore, the use of the CoR can be perceived as an important element in 
designing the strategy of a region for participation within MLG.
The idea of transition regions needed to be disseminated. The actors from 
Saxony-Anhalt pursued this objective and contributed to the sharing of information to the 
European actors and among the regions. The use of the resources for the pursuit of the 
transition regions goal shows the characteristics of the MLG Type I. The institutional 
architecture maintains the structure of the elected legislature, the executive and the 
judicial system. The decision-making powers are dispersed across the jurisdictions. This 
aspect is further discussed when the subnational participation within MLG via the 
Bundesrat and the CoR is addressed.
In May 2011, the Commissioner for Regional Policy, Johannes Hahn, presented further 
information related to the cohesion policy within the framework of ordinary consultations. 
He indicated the dimension of multi-level governance in the cohesion regulations 
package and mentioned for the first time the safety net (minimal financial allocation) for 
the possible group of transition regions. (Landesvertretung Sachsen-Anhalt bei der EU, 
2012:23-4)
Even though the category of transition regions was not endorsed at the beginning, the 
category is entailed in the cohesion package regulations for 2014-2020. This category 
sees for a specific aid allocation method, a higher co-financing rate -  in between the 
one for less developed and more developed regions, as well as more flexibility for the 
choice of investment priorities. (Smets, 2013: 61)
Saxony-Anhalt mobilized at the different levels within the EU in order to get support for 
the regulation of the specific transition eligibility criteria. Promoting this particular interest 
was difficult due to the possible change of eligibility from one financial period to the next 
one. For this purpose, the actors accomplished different functions. On the one hand, 
there was the gathering of information especially from the European level on the policy­
making process. Connected to this function is the function of representation of interests. 
These functions overlap each other and the function of partnership because Saxony- 
Anhalt did not act only on its behalf, but it also sought partners in regions with similar 
interests. Thus, Saxony-Anhalt has been involved in shaping the European Cohesion 
Policy at different levels, especially through the inner-state negotiations on position 
papers via the Bundesrat and through the Committee of the Regions, expressing the 
concerns of regions in the position papers.
Saxony-Anhalt has been using the inner-state channel to present its interests regarding 
the category of transition regions as well. It is obvious that regional needs can differ at 
some extent from the needs and interests of a member states in particular. Precisely in
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such cases, the Commission has been enforcing the idea of adapting the use of 
cohesion policy to the needs of the regions. Hence, it can make a difference if the actors 
of a region struggle to be heard with regard to their specific needs. (Sălăgeanu, 2014)
In a nutshell, Saxony-Anhalt -  due to its practice within the Federal Republic of 
Germany -  has made use of its existence as a space for politics and pursued vertically 
its interests within the system-wide framework of the EU multi-level governance by 
promoting its case at the European and national level, and horizontally among the 
German Länder and the other European regions that shared its view. Through the MLG 
dispersion of authority, the European and the national level must work together when 
regulations are being decided. The created institutions, such as the Committee of the 
Regions, or regional representations in Brussels contributed with input in the form of 
information and position papers to the European policy-making process. The dynamics 
of the negotiations and the reform of the European Cohesion Policy were spanned over 
different legislature periods at all involved levels.
4. Conclusion
The Multi-level Governance approach is used as a theoretical framework because it has 
brought the attention to the role and the contribution of the regional level within the EU. 
MLG has been developing as a practice of the European institutions providing a working 
framework of the EU that wished to enhance the involvement of the regions within the 
overall governance processes. Since regions are active within the EU, they mobilize and 
become part of MLG.
Multi-level Governance gives an overview of the collective EU decision-making 
processes. The first type acknowledges MLG based on the federalist approach. The 
second type looks more into the task-specific issues and their specific jurisdictions. The 
engagement of regions within MLG was intended to contribute to the improvement of the 
implementation of the European Cohesion Policy. However, the increased participation 
of regional actors enlarged the scope of policy implementation towards contributing to 
policy-making activities.
The emergence of the regional component within European politics is based on the 
acknowledgement of regions as actors at the European level. This acknowledgement 
provides the opportunity for interaction between regional actors and the actors active 
and present at the European level. From this perspective, regions are analyzed as 
elements of the broader processes of European politics. Hence, regions can be 
conceptualized as spaces for politics that encompasses (collective) actors, their defined 
interests, coordination of their (collective) actions, public institutions and actors that 
manage related policy issues.
Jeffery (2000: 7-8) criticizes the fact that MLG is focused mainly on EU structural policy 
and, that the MLG approach maintains a top-down perspective focusing on the central 
state towards the European level. Nevertheless, the bottom-up mobilization process can 
be researched as well and can enlighten how regions that have specific interest can 
pursue them.
The specific interest that Saxony-Anhalt promoted in the years 2000 was the need of 
establishing rules and the category of transition regions within the regulations for the 
use of European funds focusing on the allocation of funds, especially after the EU 
enlargements from 2004 and 2007. This particular topic falls under the policy that 
provided the basis for the development of the approach of multi-level governance.
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Saxony-Anhalt brought into the attention of the European Commission that through the 
accession of the new member states, the allocation of European funds would be shifting 
due to the statistical effect. Saxony-Anhalt was also affected by this. The statistical data 
lies at the core of categorization of regions for the European funds allocation. A 
reduction of funds due to the statistical effect posed a challenge for Saxony-Anhalt. In 
order to mitigate the reduction of funds allocation, the actors of Saxony-Anhalt 
addressed this matter and asked for transition rules and the introduction of a ‘transition 
regions’ category within the European Regional Policy, in order to ease the effects of 
European funds reduction.
Bibliography
[1] Ahner, D. (2012) ,Die Vertretung der ostdeutschen Bundesländer in Brüssel: Ein 
Erfahrungsbericht aus der Arbeit der Kommission‘, in Renzsch, W. and Wobben, 
T. (ed.) 20 Jahre ostdeutsche Landesvertretungen in Brüssel. Eine Bilanz der 
Interessenvertretung der Länder aus unterschiedlichen Blickwinkeln, Baden­
Baden: Nomos.
[2] Bache, I. (2004), ‘Multi-level Governance and the European Union Regional 
Policy’, in Bache, I. and Flinders, M. (ed.) Multi-level Governance, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
[3] Benz, A. (1998), ‘German regions in the European Union -  From joint policy­
making to multi-level governance’, in Le Galés, P and Lequesne, C. (ed.) 
Regions in Europe, London: Routledge.
[4] Benz, A. and Eberlein, B. (1999) ‘The Europeanization of regional policies: 
patterns of multi-level governance’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 6, no.
2, pp. 329-48.
[5] Benz, A. and Zimmer, C. (2010) ‘The EU’s competences: The ‘vertical’ 
perspective on the multi-level system’, Living Reviews in European Governance, 
vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 5-31.
[6] Bovis, C. (2011) ‘The Role and Function of Structural and Cohesion Funds and 
the Interaction of the EU Regional Policy with the Internal Market Policies’, in 
Panara, C. and de Becker, A. (ed.) The Role of Regions in EU Governance, 
Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer Verlag.
[7] Carter, C. and Pasquier, R. (2010) ‘The Europeanization of Regions as ‘Spaces 
for Politics’: A research agenda’, Regional and Federal Studies, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 
295-314.
[8] Conzelmann, T. (2008) ‘A new mode of governing? Multi-level Governance 
between Cooperation and Conflict’, in Conzelmann, T. and Smith, R. (ed.): Multi­
level Governance in the European Union: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, 
Baden-Baden: Nomos.
[9] Dunford, M. and Perrons, D. (2012), ‘Regional Inequality in the EU: How to 
Finance Greater Cohesion’, European Planning Studies, iFirst article, pp. 1-28.
[10] Gamble, A. (2004) ‘Foreword’, in Bache, I. and Flinders, M. (ed.), Multi-level 
Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sălăgeanu, Regional implementation of Multi-level Governance Type I 66
[11] Hooghe, L. (1995), ‘Subnational Mobilization in the European Union’, West 
European Politics, vol. 18, issue 3, pp. 175-198.
[12] Hooghe, L. (1996) ‘Building a Europe with the Regions: The Changing role of the 
European Commission’, in Hooghe, L. (ed.), Cohesion policy and European 
integration: Building multi-level governance, New York: Oxford University Press.
[13] Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2001), ‘Types of Multi-Level Governance’, European 
Integration online Papers, vol. 5.
[14] Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2003), ‘Unraveling the central state, but how? Types 
of multi-level governance‘, Reihe Politikwissenschaft, vol. 87, Wien: Inst. für 
Höhere Studien.
[15] Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2009), ‘Rise of regions’, in Committee of the Regions, 
The Cahiers of the CoR Vers une gouvernance a plusieurs niveaux en Europe? 
Towards Multi-level Governance in Europe?, vol. I, 2009.
[16] Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2010), ‘Types of Multilevel Governance’, in Enderlein, 
H., Wälti, S., and Zürn, M. (ed.), Handbook on Multilevel Governance, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
[17] Jeffery, C. (2000) ‘Sub-national Mobilization and European Integration: Does it 
Make Any Difference?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 38, issue 1, pp. 
1-23.
[18] Keating, M. (1998) The new regionalism in Western Europe: territorial 
restructuring and political change, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
[19] Kohler-Koch, B. and Rittberger, B. (2009) ‘A Futile Quest for Coherence: The 
Many Frames of EU Governance’, in: Kohler-Koch, B. and Larat, F. (ed.) 
European Multi-Level Governance. Contrasting Images in National Research, 
Cheltenham Northampton: Edward Elgar.
[20] Landesvertretung Sachsen-Anhalt bei der Europäischen Union, EU 
Wochenspiegel Jahresrückblick 2011, Nr. 01/12 vom 06.01.2012.
[21] Marks, G. (1993) ‘Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EC’, in 
Cafruny, A. and Rosenthal, G. (ed.), The State and the European Community, 
New York: Lynne Rinner.
[22] Marks, G., Hooghe, L. and Blank, K. (1996) ‘European integration from the 
1980s: State-centric v. multi-level governance’, Journal of Common Market 
studies, vol. 34, issue 3, September, pp. 341-378.
[23] Marks, G. (2001) ‘An Actor-Centred Approach to Multi-level Governance’, in 
Jeffery, C. (ed.) The regional dimension of the European Union. Towards a third 
level in Europe?, London: Frank Cass.
[24] Marks, G., Hooghe, L. and Schakel, A. H. (2008) ‘Patterns of Regional Authority’, 
Regional and Federal Studies, vol. 18, issues 2-3, pp. 167-181.
[25] Official Journal of the EU (2013), REGULATION (EU) No 1303/2013 OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 17 December 2013 
laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, 
the European 
Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural
Sălăgeanu, Regional implementation of Multi-level Governance Type I 67
Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and laying down 
general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European 
Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund 
and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006.
[26] Official Journal of the EU (2006), COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1083/2006 
of 11 July laying down general provisions of the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999.
[27] Ranneberg, J. and Wolf, J. (2002) ‘Sachsen-Anhalt und die Erweiterung der EU’, 
in Wolf, J., Rannenberg, J., Mattfeld, H. and Giebel, H. (ed.) Jahrbuch für Politik 
und Gesellschaft in Sachsen-Anhalt 2002, Halle: Mitteldeutscher Verlag.
[28] Sălăgeanu, R. (2014) ‘Creating European Policy from a Regional Perspective -  
The Innovation of Transition Regions within the Regional Policy of the EU’, 
Czech Journal of Political Science, issue 2, pp. 131-150.
[29] Smets, I. (2013) ‘In the beginning was GDP’, Europolitics, no. 2.
[30] Tömmel, I. and Verdun, A. (2009) ‘Innovative Governance in the European 
Union’, in Tömmel, I. and Verdun, A. (ed.) Innovative Governance in the 
European Union -  The Politics of Multilevel Policymaking, Boulder London: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers.
[31] Wright, V. (1998) ‘Intergovernmental relations and regional government in 
Europe’, in Le Galés, P. and Lequesne, C. (ed.) Regions in Europe, London: 
Routledge.
